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The article aims at presenting an overview of the main concepts in the philosophical 
thought of Zhang Shenfu, one of the leading intellectuals from Republican China (1912–
1949). The study sets out from a brief summary of Zhang’s intellectual achievements, and 
proceeds by offering a more concise picture of the main influences, developmental stages 
and finally also central ideas of Zhang’s thought. By offering a general view on the con-
crete confluences and dissonances between the keystones of Zhang’s philosophy on one 
side, and its alleged sources in Western and Chinese philosophy on the other, this study 
further aims at presenting a new insight into the unique characteristics of Zhang’s phi-
losophy. At the same time, by setting the discussion on Zhang’s philosophy in a broader 
context of contemporary intellectual discourse, the article also endeavours to establish a 
tentative basis for the future critical analyses and potential revaluations of Zhang Shenfu’s 
role in intellectual history of modern China. 
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Mejna območja objektivizma in vseobsežnosti: uvod h ključnim pojmom 
filozofske misli Zhang Shenfuja (1919–1948)
Izvleček
Članek podaja pregled osrednjih pojmov v filozofski misli Zhang Shenfuja, enega pomem-
bnejših kitajskih intelektualcev iz republikanskega obdobja (1912–1949). Študija poda 
kratek povzetek Zhangovih intelektualnih dosežkov, celovitejšo sliko glavnih vplivov in 
razvojnih stopenj ter osrednje ideje Zhangove filozofske misli. S splošnim pogledom na 
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konkretna sovpadanja in razhajanja med temeljnimi pojmi Zhangove filozofije na eni st-
rani ter njenimi domnevnimi viri v zahodni in kitajski filozofiji na drugi poskuša ta študija 
predstaviti nove vpoglede v edinstvene značilnosti Zhangove filozofije. Z umestitvijo raz-
prave o Zhangovi filozofiji v širši kontekst sodobnega intelektualnega diskurza želi članek 
hkrati vzpostaviti začasno osnovo za prihodnje kritične analize in morebitna ponovna 
ovrednotenja Zhang Shenfujeve vloge v intelektualni zgodovini moderne Kitajske. 
Ključne besede: Zhang Shenfu, objektivizem, obširnost, moderna kitajska filozofija, dial-
ektični materializem, zahodna znanost, matematična logika 
Introduction
Zhang Shenfu 張申府 (1893–1986), originally called Songnian 崧年, was an 
important Chinese intellectual, who contributed greatly to the propagation of 
Western science, analytical philosophy and dialectical materialism in 1920s and 
1930s China. As an important member of the May Fourth intellectual elite, he 
took part in shaping of the left-oriented intellectual movement at Peking Uni-
versity. As a close colleague of Li Dazhao, Zhang was a senior member of the 
communist movement in Beijing and a cofounder of the CPC (Communist Party 
of China). Having been a notoriously outspoken and prolific writer, and later also 
as an important member of the first modern Department of Philosophy at Qing-
hua University (between 1929 and 1936), Zhang played an important role in the 
processes of the dissemination and establishment of Western modern philosophy 
in Republican China. 
In the intellectual history of modern China, Zhang has generally been credited for 
pioneering contributions to the introduction and propagation of the philosophy of 
Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 1920s and early 1930s.2 To a mi-
nor degree, Zhang has also been credited for his general introduction of Freud’s 
psychoanalysis in the early 1920s,3 and the earliest introduction of the philosophy 
2 Thus, for example: Wen and Cui (2001, 359–66).
3 As an example of first introduction Jiang and Ivanhoe (2013, 26–28) mention Zhang’s article 
“Social Questions (Shehui wenti 社會問題)” from 1922, which written and published during 
his stay in Paris. Allegedly in 1922, Zhang attended Freud’s lectures at the University of Paris 
(Zhang 1993, 99). However, Zhang was already interested in modern psychology back in the 
late 1910s, mainly due to his impression that Russell also had a deep interest in psychology. 
Thus, in 1920 he published an abridged translation of Russell’s essay “The Modern Science of 
Psychology ( Jindai xinlixue 近代心理學)” in the New Youth, which also mentioned Freud’s 
psychoanalysis.    
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of the Vienna School (early 1930s), in particular the thought of Rudolf Carnap.4 
Above all, he is given credit for his support for the philosophy of Russell and 
Wittgenstein—he also created the first translation of the latter’s Tractatus Logi-
co-Philosophicus into Chinese.5 However, maybe the most important of all Zhang’s 
contributions to the development of the discourse of modern science and philoso-
phy in China was his early dissemination of the notion of mathematical logic, fol-
lowed by his many-year long lecturing about Russell’s mathematical logic at most 
prestigious Chinese universities, such as Peking and Qinghua. Zhang was also the 
first Chinese philosopher to have organized a specialized course on mathematical 
logic, Russell or Wittgenstein at any Chinese university.6
Beside biographical accounts, all that still bears testimony about Zhang’s active 
role in the intellectual developments of the 1920s and 1930s has been preserved 
in a relatively rich corpus of his philosophical writings. His collected works reveal 
both what may have been the main reason why Zhang was erased from the his-
torical archives of mathematical logic in China, as well as the manner in which 
Zhang actually propagated philosophical and scientific ideas from the West. Apart 
from numerous translations of works by Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Rudolf Carnap, and the like, the main corpus of Zhang’s writings that touched 
upon either modern philosophy or mathematical logic was written in form of 
philosophical meditations, through which Zhang expounded either on matters 
of a practical, political nature or his own philosophical worldview. Throughout 
Zhang’s opus from the 1920s and 1930s, a general notion of mathematical logic 
usually occurred alongside the main collection of other key ideas, which Zhang 
adopted from Russell, dialectical materialism, Vienna School or traditional Chi-
nese cosmology and ethical thought. In this sense, Zhang’s comprehensive, syn-
cretistic philosophical outlook was also the main means of his propagation and 
dissemination of the above-mentioned ideas. 
4 Together with his younger brother Zhang Dainian 張岱年 (1909–2004). See, for example Jiang Yi 
(2009).
5 The translation titled Mingli lun 名理論 (Luoji-zhexue lun 邏輯哲學論) was published in two 
parts in the Xiandai pinglun 現代評論, in 1927 and 1928.
6 The nature of his role in the history of mathematical logic in China is still a matter of discussion. 
The majority of historical surveys on this subject either do not recognise Zhang’s role at all or only 
briefly mention him as the first proponent of Russell’s philosophy in China. As examples thereof, 
see Zhou and Zhou 1989, 1–25; Zhou 2004, 398–406; Lin and Zhang 1983; Shi and Zeng 1998; 
and Song 2000. This trend has been reversed only recently by the study of Su and Dai (2019), 
who in their article “Zhang Shenfu’s Contribution to Early Dissemination of Mathematical Logic 
in China (Zhang Shenfu dui shuli luoji zai Zhongguo zaoqi chuanbo de gongxian 張申府對數
理邏輯在中國早期傳播的貢獻)” delivered a non-critical overview of Zhang’s publications and 
translations from the 1920s and 1930s, set into the framework of Zhang’s own autobiographical 
accounts of that period.    
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When it came to his contribution to the development of mathematical logic as a 
scientific discipline, he was first and foremost one of the leading propagators of 
the notion of mathematical logic, which he communicated through his version of 
an all-encompassing and profoundly pragmatic scientific worldview. Even when, 
in the final years of the 1920s, he started lecturing at the prestigious Qinghua 
University, teaching the first ever courses devoted explicitly to mathematical logic 
and Russell in China, he applied the same approach in these lectures as in his 
philosophical meditations.7 Zhang tended to explain concepts from mathematical 
logic from an everyday perspective, intertwined with problems from contempo-
rary politics and ethics, as well as the general scientific outlook. Furthermore, in 
the early 1930s the content of his lectures on logic also gained a strong political 
undertone, due to his ardent advocacy of dialectical materialism and then philo-
sophical conviction that mathematical logic and dialectical materialism could be 
combined into one, on the other. 
Zhang’s philosophical attempt to create a synthesis between two contesting cur-
rents in contemporary Chinese philosophy, namely dialectical materialism and 
analytic philosophy (or more specifically dialectical method and mathematical 
logic), also constituted the main reason behind Zhang’s rise as one of the most 
important leftist intellectuals in the early 1930s. Thus, the unofficial Marxist his-
toriographer from the period, Guo Zhanbo 郭湛波 (original name Guo Hai-
qing 郭海清, 1905–1989), recognized Zhang’s attempt to bridge dialectical ma-
terialism and mathematical logic as an important phase in (the Marxist vision 
of ) the development of logical method in China8 (Guo 1965, 225–32).9 While 
this philosophical outlook, which constituted the main source of his intellectual 
renown in the 1930s, represented the second phase of Zhang’s intellectual de-
velopment, similar efforts to interlink social and political reform with the main 
results of Western science, and to synthesize a socialist vision of society with an-
alytical natural science, had already been at the forefront of his endeavours in the 
1920s. Looking from the perspective of later political developments, one might 
conjecture that Zhang’s main contribution to intellectual development in Repub-
lican China was his tireless advocacy of the profound theoretical compatibility 
7 His tendency to translate logical concepts into simple, everyday terms, and his strong impetus to-
wards illuminating the interrelatedness of theory and practice, made his lectures on logic the most 
popular and well-attended class at the department (Sun 1988, 30).
8 Apparently, this was an important agenda of leftist intellectuals at the time, especially given the fact 
that logical treaties were among the rare English texts that were read even by Mao Zedong himself 
(Tian 2019, 18).
9 I am referring to Guo’s work Chinese Intellectual History in the Last Fifty Years (Jin wushi nian 
Zhongguo sixiangshi 近五十年中國思想史), which was first published in 1935. Guo was also a 
former student of Zhang. 
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between Marxist philosophy on one side, and analytic philosophy and traditional 
Chinese thought on the other. Through his philosophy, for more than two dec-
ades Zhang made great efforts at convincing the young Chinese Marxists of the 
immense importance of things like “mathematical logic”, comprehensiveness and 
greater objectivism for all future constructions of Chinese society.10 It is not only 
due to his key role and influence within the course of intellectual developments of 
the 1920s and 30s, but also due to the extreme relevancy of Zhang’s philosophical 
thought in a broader temporal perspective, that his ideas ought to be considered 
as important for our understanding of the modern China. 
Besides Zhang’s intellectual extravagance, one of the main reasons why his philos-
ophy went widely unnoticed for so many decades is related to his gradual academ-
ic and political demise which followed his arrest and—politically motivated—ex-
pulsion from Qinghua University in 1936.11 Following the events of 1936, the 
academic persona of Zhang Shenfu started slowly fading into obscurity,12 while 
his political demise was completed in 1948, when he was finally banished from 
the circles of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and declared the enemy of 
the people by the Guomindang (GMD, KMT).13 The affair of 1948 was also the 
main reason why, for many decades following the establishment of the People’s 
Republic (PRC), both his philosophy and contribution to the establishment of 
mathematical logic in China were almost completely forgotten. Zhang’s life and 
thought were rediscovered only in 1979, and only as a result of his interviews with 
Vera Schwarcz (see Schwarcz 1992).
Consequently, from the early 1980s on, numerous studies devoted to Zhang 
Shenfu’s philosophy started to emerge in Chinese academic circles. The first sub-
stantial act of rediscovery happened with the publication of The Collected Scholarly 
Writings of Zhang Shenfu (Zhang Shenfu xueshu lunwenji 张申府學術論文集) in 
10 Zhang allegedly recruited both Zhou Enlai and Zhu De into the Chinese Communist cells he es-
tablished in Paris and Berlin. When Mao Zedong was working as an apprentice at the Peking Uni-
versity Library, Zhang was his supervisor. Later, in the late 1930s, Mao wrote letters of reverence 
to Zhang, and in the early 1940s met with him on several occasions during his visits in Chongqing 
(Meng 2014, 23).
11 Zhang was arrested on charges of having participated in the 1936 student protests in Beijing, 
which broke out in the aftermath of the December 9th Movement (1935). 
12 Following the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 Zhang served as a member of 
the People’s Political Council, until in 1940 he renounced the position after a conflict with the 
Council’s President Jiang Jieshi 蔣介石. After that he assumed the post of the editor-in-chief of 
the government’ periodical Wartime Culture (Zhanshi wenhua 戰時文化) (Zhang 1993, 114–15). 
Ultimately Zhang ended up working again in the library of the Peking University.  
13 The reason for this was the publication of his article “An Appeal for Peace (Huyu heping 呼籲和
平)”, which became the target of fierce criticism by the Party.
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1985. However, the most important studies on Zhang Shenfu’s philosophy started 
to appear only in the late 1990s.14 The following decade saw a further increase in 
the number of Chinese studies on Zhang’s philosophy.15 However, as indicated by 
Guo Qiyong (2018, 324) in his book Studies on Contemporary Chinese Philosophy 
(1949–2009): in numerous publications on Zhang Shenfu that were published in 
the last four decades “the inner logic of his dialectical materialism, his incorpo-
ration of traditional Chinese thought … into his philosophy, and his integration 
of Western logic and analytic philosophy into dialectical materialism remain rel-
atively unexplored”.
This article thus intends to provide a new attempt at grasping Zhang’s incorpora-
tion and integration of Western and Chinese thought, by presenting an overview 
of a few main concepts or keywords that constantly reoccur in his writings in the 
period between 1919 and 1948. Secondly, this study will try to tentatively link 
these concepts either to their original sources or major events in the contemporary 
Chinese intellectual world. Apart from “comprehensiveness”, which is the thread 
connecting his entire philosophy, the article will closely examine the notions of 
“pure” or “greater objectivism”, “dialectical materialism”, “logical” and “dialectical 
analysis” and “concrete relativism” in Zhang’s philosophy. Zhang’s notion of math-
ematical logic, which is essential for our understanding of not only his philosophy 
but also of the early development of this scientific discipline in China, will be 
discussed in a separate study. This article is therefore intended as a preliminary 
study to subsequent critical discussions on the content and value of Zhang Shen-
fu’s philosophy. 
We shall first take a closer look at three main influences in Zhang’s intellectual 
development. 
14 For example: in 1997, the essay entitled “Zhang Shenfu’s Philosophical Thought (Zhang Shenfu de 
zhexue sixiang 张申府的哲學思想)” was written by his younger brother Zhang Dainian and pub-
lished as a chapter of his book Culture Clash and Cultural Fusion (Wenhua de chongtu yu ronghe 文化
的衝突與融合). Li Weiwu 李維武 devoted an entire chapter of his doctoral dissertation entitled 
“Ontological Questions in Twentieth-Century Chinese Philosophy (Ershi shiji Zhongguo zhexue 
bentilun wenti 二十世紀中國哲學本體論問題)” to an in-depth analysis of the main pillars of 
Zhang Shenfu’s philosophy.
15 Among most notable publications was the book Exploring the New Culture of Modern China: A 
Study of Zhang Shenfu’s Thought (Xiandai Zhongguo xin wenhua de tansuo: Zhang Shenfu sixiang 
yanjiu 現代中國新文化的探索：張申府思想的研究) by Guo Yiqu 郭一曲 (2002). Zhang’s phi-
losophy was also analysed in Guo’s article “Analytical Dialectical Materialism: Zhang Shenfu’s 
Philosophical Thought ( Jiexi de bianzheng weiwu zhuyi: Zhang Shenfu de zhexue sixiang 解析的
辨證唯物論: 張申府的哲學思想)” (2001).
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The Three Influences: Chinese Tradition, Russell and Dialectical 
Materialism 
Even though between 1919 and 1949 Zhang produced a considerable number of 
texts, covering a wide array of different questions and topics, it is extremely difficult 
to distil a comprehensive image of his philosophy from these. One of the main 
reasons for this is that in the vast majority of cases Zhang’s views were conveyed 
through concepts adopted from philosophers like Russell. Works that would of-
fer a profound and broad insight into the whole picture of his world of ideas are 
thus extremely rare. Even his central philosophical work, Reflections (Suosi 所思) 
(1931), consists only of fragments, a concatenation of more or less abstract flashes 
of thought. Moreover, in his entire career Zhang did not produce a single original 
text on mathematical logic, mathematics or any other fields he had been concerned 
with academically, but rather devoted all his energy to the dissemination of indi-
vidual concepts or “keywords” related to his scientific worldview, usually in concrete 
political or social contexts. It was quite probable that Zhang himself was also fully 
aware of this shortcoming of his philosophical repertoire, which was the reason why, 
in 1945, almost a decade after he was discharged from his post as a professor of logic 
and Western philosophy at Qinghua University, he composed an article entitled 
“My Own Philosophy (Wo ziji de zhexue 我自己的哲學)” (1945a).
However, a closer look at Zhang’s writings from the period between early 1920s 
up to the late 1940s reveals three main sources behind his ideas: Russell’s sci-
entific worldview, traditional Chinese thought (Confucianism and ancient cos-
mology), and dialectical materialism. According to his focus at the time, Zhang’s 
thought can be divided into three major periods: In the first, which stretched from 
late 1910s, when he arrived at Peking University, down to around 1928, Zhang’s 
thought revolved around a specific version of Western scientific worldview as ad-
vocated by Bertrand Russell. In the second period, which started in late 1920s 
and lasted until the end of his academic career in 1936, Zhang turned his at-
tention towards dialectical materialism, combining it with notions from Russell’s 
philosophy, ideas related to the Vienna School, Wittgenstein, and philosophical 
concepts from Chinese tradition. Zhang’s ideas from the first half of this period 
were summarized in his Reflections (1931). Finally, following his expulsion from 
academia, the orientation of Zhang’s philosophical thought underwent another 
drastic transformation. Thus, from around 1936 until his political demise in 1948, 
Zhang’s focus shifted to the idea of “new enlightenment” (xin qimeng 新啓蒙),16 
democracy and the advancement of science in China. 
16  After he was released from prison in 1936, Zhang and his friend Chen Boda 陳伯達 (1904–1989) 
started what became known as the New Enlightenment Movement (see: Schwarcz 1986, 222–30).
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In addition to ideas from the above-mentioned three main sources, throughout 
his entire academic and political career Zhang’s thought was defined by his per-
sistent tendency towards comprehensiveness. Zhang’s incessant effort to create 
harmonic syntheses between seemingly antagonistic principles, concepts or the-
ories, was not just a standpoint or an attitude Zhang had consciously decided to 
adopt, but rather a perspective inherent in traditional Chinese cosmological (in 
Confucianism a “onto-moral”) outlook, a harmonistic holism founded on the 
idea of complementary dialectics—the concept of “equilibrium” (zhongyong 中
庸, formerly compared to the idea of “the [unprejudiced golden] mean”),17 “hu-
maneness” (ren 仁, also translated as “benevolence; humanity”), and so on. On 
the other hand, however, in the intellectual developments following the May 
Fourth period such syncretistic visions were not exactly typical of the so-called 
“modern” attitudes towards the future Chinese identity. The idea of synthesiz-
ing, for example, Western scientific (material) civilization and Chinese spiritual 
civilization, had been more prevalent in the earlier period, when such harmoni-
zation was considered necessary within a profoundly evolutionary perspective. 
Even though, as we have said, this might have well been an inherently tradi-
tional way of cosmological thinking, a more direct source for Zhang’s prefer-
ence for, as it were, “dialectical harmonization”, might have been Zhang’s senior 
colleague and former teacher of logic Zhang Shizhao 章士釗 (1881–1973).18 In 
fact, Zhang Shenfu’s autobiographical accounts suggest that even his interest 
in logic as well as his attitude towards terminology and significantly antiquated 
style of “logical writing” might have as well been the result of Zhang Shizhao’s 
influence (Zhang 1993, 72–77).19
17 Zhang also spoke about “proportionality” or “proper measure” (fencun 分寸), which he also equated 
to emotional temperance, “authentic good” (zhen shan 真善) and “beauty” or “excellence” (mei 美) 
(Zhang 2005 III, 184–85).
18 In his political writings, published in the Tiger magazine(s) from 1914 on, Zhang developed a 
harmonistic (xiehe 協和) theory of evolution, which stipulated the harmonic unity between the 
mutually opposed Western and Eastern culture as the main condition for the “evolutionary pres-
ervation” of both. Zhang further adopted the traditional concept of the mean (zhong 中) to explain 
the necessity for a synergetic relationship between the antagonistic factors in the universe (see 
Guo 2000). In parallel to his philosophical views, Zhang Shizhao espoused a universalistic notion 
of logic, which also entailed the universal application of knowledge across cultures. See: Zhang 
Shizhao’s Essentials of Logic (Luoji zhiyao 邏輯指要)—the manuscript for the book, which was 
first published in 1939, was originally completed in 1917. Zhang Shizhao’s harmonistic views on 
logic and science were also summed up in his speech for 20th anniversary of the university (Guoli 
Beijing daxue 1918, 15).
19 On the early nature and impact of Zhang Shizhao’s “logical writing style” (luoji wen 邏輯文), see 
Kurtz 2020.
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The above-mentioned inclination to philosophical comprehensiveness was al-
ready present in Zhang’s early thought.20 If in the early 1920s this innate procliv-
ity of Zhang’s was still working in service of his fervent devotion to Russell and 
“all things scientific”, his priorities changed in the years following the polemic 
on science and the view on life (kexue yu renshengguan 科學與人生觀)21 which 
developed in 1923. Generally speaking, this debate caused yet another schism in 
the Chinese intellectual climate, which had always been quite prone to dichoto-
mic self-representation. The new dilemma had been set out by Zhang Junmai 
張君勱 (1887–1969), who proceeded from a notion of the bipartite division of 
world-philosophy, to a dichotomic division between science and views on life 
(Nelson 2020, 183), or in other words, between objective and subjective systems 
of knowledge. In this Zhang Junmai on the one hand reconfirmed the old para-
digm of the innate subjectivity of Chinese thought, yet on the other established 
a relation between Chinese thought and intuition, comprehensiveness, free will 
and, most importantly, the cultivation of the inner self with a strong emphasis on 
the uniqueness of an individual’s mind (xin 心), or psyche (Zhang Junmai et al. 
1997, 33–40), Thus, in the second half of the 1920s, Zhang’s profound desire to 
harmonize pairs of irreconcilable poles became stronger than ever. His battle to 
overcome the division between the subjective and objective, which was catalysed 
by his explorations of Freudian psychoanalysis and growing passion for materialist 
dialectics, led him to scrutinize his former image of Russell, and to conclude that 
his “logical analysis” represented only one side of the “cosmological coin”.22 Con-
sequently, in the second half of the 1920s he developed his own solution to the 
20 For instance: during Russell’s visit in China, in 1921, in an essay “My Reservations about Russell” 
Zhang’s long-standing friend Liang Shuming warned against “quests for an all-encompassing, 
comprehensive philosophy” such as the one pursued by Zhang. Liang went on to add: 
 Truths attained through such comprehensive philosophies might sound good. Indeed, they appear 
to be perfect in their claim to certainty. But the real truth is always more complex. It is neither as 
pleasant nor as fine sounding as Russell likes to claim. A scholar is an expert only in his own field. 
Outside of it, he is just a commoner. Zhang Shenfu is right in saying that “Today’s philosophy be-
longs either to the Russell’s school of to that of Bergson”. One is a leader in rationalism, the other 
is a leader in non-rational thought. (Schwarcz 1991/2, 138)   
21 The chief representative of the pro-science side in the debate, Ding Wenjiang 丁文江 (1887–1936) 
alternatively called the debate “Science and Metaphysics” (Kexue yu xuanxue 科學與玄學).
22 In a conversation with V. Schwarcz, Zhang admitted that: 
 Russell, you see, ended up so one-sided in his philosophical outlook. His philosophy is useful in 
seeing only discrete parts of a problem. I wanted to think about the whole. In many ways Russell 
was biased. He opposed materialism. But materialism and idealism are just two sides of the same 
coin. Materialism does not see the mind (xin 心) while idealism fails to appreciate outward reali-
ties. My own philosophy seeks for a more comprehensive view of experience, for a more thorough 
realism, for an expansive objectivity. (Schwarcz 1991/2, 143)
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objectivist dichotomies bothering the minds of his fellow countrymen, a method 
or epistemological theory which he chose to call “pure objectivism”. 
Apart from “comprehensiveness”, the core of Zhang’s philosophy consisted of 
various concepts, principles or perspectives extracted from the three main sources 
set out above. At the same time, at a macroscopic level, Zhang’s philosophy was 
also a synthesis between three kinds of worldviews. Thus, when it came to his af-
finity with Russell’s philosophy, Zhang did not simply adopt particular ideas, but 
rather the form of scientific worldview or objectivity which was conveyed through 
the Russell’s thought. In Zhang’s understanding, all aspects of Russell’s thought 
were founded on pure scientific facts, derived with the help of most advanced 
scientific methods and theories of the time, above all else mathematical logic and 
relativistic physics.23 He believed that the essence of Russell’s thought resided in 
mathematical logic, which in itself was a harmonic fusion between mathematics 
and logic.24 Furthermore, in Zhang’s understanding, Russell’s main philosophical 
method, which he chose to call the “logico-analytical method” or “logical analy-
sis”, was derived directly from mathematical logic. Back in 1920, when Zhang was 
preparing the stage for his mentor’s arrival in China, he described Russell and his 
work in the following manner: 
Russell is currently the world’s leading mathematical philosopher, who 
greatly contributed to the founding of a most splendid new learning (i.e. 
mathematical logic (shuli luoji 數理邏輯), also called symbolic logic (jihao 
luoji 記號邏輯) or logistic (luojisitike 邏輯斯諦科)), which inaugurated 
a new period in the development of modern scientific thought. Founded 
on his critical survey of mathematics, he also established a new kind phil-
osophical method (in terms of spirit it is the scientific method in philos-
ophy, in regard to manner it is the “logical and analytical method” (luojide 
23 Zhang started closely following modern physics after his conversations with Russell, held in Bei-
jing in 1921. Nevertheless, because in his Chinese lectures Russell also devoted much attention 
to Einstein and the epistemological consequences of modern physics (Schwarcz 1991/2, 133), 
his Chinese audience seems to have got the same impression, namely that Russell’s philosophy 
was inherently intertwined with relativistic physics and hence an integral component of the same 
worldview. In his critical expositions on Russell’s “logicist New Realism” from 1922–1923, the 
philosopher Zhang Dongsun—who accompanied Russell for the most time of his stay in Chi-
na—regarded Einstein’s relativity as one of the main epistemological tenets of the former’s logicist 
variety of realism (see Zhang Dongsun 1923).
24 In “A Revolution in Science” (1920b) Zhang claimed that, alongside non-Euclidean geometry in 
mathematics and theory of relativity in physics, Russell’s mathematical logic constituted on of the 
three main revolutions in science. In his view, its revolutionary character came from the fact that 
in itself it harmonically intertwined both mathematics and logic (Zhang 1920b). On Zhang’s early 
ideas on dialectical nature of mathematics see Zhang’s article “Philosophical Principles of Num-
bers” from 1919.  
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he jiexide fangfa 邏輯的和解析的方法), which might also be translated 
as “mingli-jiexifa” 名理 解析法 [logico-analytical method]). His philos-
ophy (called “logical atomism” or “absolute pluralism”, which presupposes 
the existence of various kinds of individual [entities] and relations and 
does not rest on the cosmological foundations that presuppose an exist-
ence of one all-encompassing entity. In plain words: it is a new research 
that sets out from the “relations” and rests on the “theory of external rela-
tions”) counts as the most influential in the contemporary philosophical 
and intellectual circles. Recently, he has also taken this “logico-analyti-
cal method”, which already had such a great effect on mathematics and 
philosophy, and conducted new research in psychology, having obtained 
results that correspond in great part to the newest psychological teach-
ing of behaviourism (xingdong zhuyi 行動主義), that emerged in Amer-
ica, and “neutral monism” (i.e. the American School of New Realism). 
(Zhang 1920a, 4)
At least three of key terms given above from Russell’s philosophy were also re-
tained in Zhang’s later thought: logical analysis, mathematical logic and the no-
tion of neutrality.25 When his philosophy approached a certain degree of maturity 
in the mid-1930s, Russell’s influence on Zhang condensed into the notion of 
“logical analysis”, which was now extended to include the Vienna School and 
Kurt Gödel, while mathematical logic was still defined as its underlaying meth-
odological basis. Concurrently, Zhang also retained a strong interest in relativistic 
physics, from which he extracted his own epistemological idea of “relativity”.
In parallel with the version of “structural objectivity” (see Daston and Galison 
2007) described above and extrapolated from Russell’s scientific worldview, quite 
early on Zhang also discovered a strong affinity for materialist dialectics. The 
reason why Western dialectics might have had such a great appeal for Zhang 
and Chinese intellectuals in general resided in its profound consonance with 
25 Between years 1919 and 1920, Zhang disseminated Russell’s idea of the universe as a “continuum” 
(xiangxuxing 相續體, “continuous substance”). He compared this idea of continuity to one from 
Buddhist epistemology—although he later withheld this information, apart from history of logic 
and philosophy of brothers Cheng, Zhang’s focus in his undergraduate studies of philosophy had 
also been Buddhist philosophy (see Guoli Beijing daxue 1918, 365). The notion of continuity in 
mathematics was also mentioned in the public debate on Russell’s mathematical philosophy in 
1925. Most importantly, even the devout Buddhist and scholar of Confucian philosophy Liang 
Shuming found Russell’s idea of “continuity” very convincing. In his critical essay on Russell’s phi-
losophy from 1921, Liang stated: “Following Mr. Zhang’s urgings, I have also tried to read Russell’s 
works and to like them. And, in fact, found that some aspects of his theories accord well with my 
own thought—such as his social psychology … I also found Russell’s theories of cognition and of 
the essential continuity of all matter very suggestive …” (Schwarcz 1991/2, 137)
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traditional Chinese reasoning and its cosmological perspectives.26 Thus, Zhang 
maintained a similar idea of dialectical materialism and traditional complemen-
tarian dialectics. In Zhang’s eyes, the discerning feature of dialectical materialism, 
however, was that it claimed to be founded on scientific facts and laws of nature 
deduced from concrete science. Whereas on the one hand Zhang related its al-
leged universality to his notion of comprehensiveness (tong 通, also “compatibili-
ty” or “free circulation”), on the other he also recognized in it the traditional idea 
of the “equilibrium” (zhong 中, also “the mean”) and “humaneness”. Nonetheless, 
similarly as in the case of Russell, Zhang did not want to invest his entire faith in 
dialectical materialism. Moreover, he elevated the traditional ideas to a position 
above both dialectical materialism as well as logical analysis, which he deemed 
to be profoundly one-sided outlooks. The traditional ethical-coloured ideas of 
harmonic “mean” and enlightening “humaneness”—which to Zhang somehow 
resembled the scientific/objectivist spirit, were both implicit in Zhang’s crowning 
theory of “pure objectiveness” (cf. Schwarcz 1991/2, 143). In a typically traditional 
sense, these ideas or onto-moral attitudes were all bridging together the private 
and common, subjective and objective, inner sensations and outer facts, and the 
ethical and material aspects of human existence. 
Finally, regarding the content of Zhang’s notion of “dialectics”, it must be not-
ed that he understood the materialist notion of dialectics from what would be 
called a traditional Chinese perspective. Generally speaking, Zhang interpreted 
dialectics through the prism of two key components of the traditional Chinese 
worldview: complementary or harmonistic dialectics (xiangcheng xiangfan 相成
相反) and the perpetually changing (bianhua 變化) totality of the universe. Con-
sequently, Zhang’s initial point of criticism against materialist dialectics had been 
its seemingly static notion of sublation (Aufhebung) or, in terms of dialectical ma-
terialism, qualitative leap forward, which in Zhang’s eyes seemed to represent 
26 In fact, Zhang spoke about the complementarity of dyadic principles long before he discovered 
dialectical materialism. In his short essay “Philosophical Principles of Numbers” (Shu zhi zheli 數
之哲理) from 1919, for instance, Zhang expounded on the phenomenological relatedness between 
pair of functionally opposite mathematical operators and natural principles an ever-changing 
world. He said: 
 In the ever-evolving world, there always exist two aspects which mutually oppose and create each 
other. Being mutually correlative, together they form function and variable (han-bian 函變) … If 
one progresses, at the same time the other recedes. If one is diverse and complex, the other is singu-
lar and simple. A dynamic factor has got a corresponding static one. If there is a progressive aspect, 
at the same time there also exists a complementary conservative factor … Therefore, the method of 
governing the world does not go beyond harmonizing and adjusting these two aspects. Following 
their natural posture, one certainly will attain their equilibrium. (Zhang 2005 II, 18)
 Zhang continued: “Many social theoreticians are familiar with this principle, and thus say that ‘the 
society’s progress is nothing but differentiation and integration’.” (ibid.)
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a “static” idea of change.27 In his later writings Zhang reaffirmed the connec-
tion between the idea that everything changes (Tianxia meiyou bubian de 天下
沒有不變的) in ancient Chinese cosmology (The Book of Change, Yijing 易經) 
and (materialist) dialectics (Zhang 1939b, 7). Zhang’s signature work, Reflections 
(Suosi 所思), reveals that he understood materialist dialectics as consisting of a 
static or perpetual complementarity between contradictory principles on one side 
and, as it were, a principle of dynamic change as embodied in the idea of sublation 
(Aufhebung) on the other. In Zhang’s understanding, these two were reflective 
of corresponding concepts of complementary dialectics and change from “Chi-
nese culture” (Zhang 2005 III, 168). Observed from another perspective, inter-
preting what Zhang believed to be Hegel’s idea of dialectics and logic,28 he also 
maintained that the pattern of dialectical complementarity, which he so keenly 
espoused, repeats itself indefinitely throughout both the doctrine of dialectical 
materialism as well as the underlying fabric of the universe. In this sense, every 
aspect of reality, be it something which embodies either thesis or antithesis, is in 
itself both “static” and “dynamic”.29 In contrast, in the dialectic principle Zhang 
saw a necessary dynamic process of change, which encompasses every aspect 
of existence. Consequently, in his conscious or unconscious attempt to create a 
balanced synthesis between traditional Chinese and Hegelian dialectics, Zhang 
27 In the article “On Translation (Lun fanyi 論翻譯)” from 1927, Zhang defined (materialist) dialec-
tics as a theory expounding the principle of the “synthesis (entanglement) of positive and negative, 
mutual opposition and mutual creation”, proposing the terms duikanfa 對戡法 and cuozongfa 錯綜
法 as alternative Chinese terms for it. Zhang further boiled the meaning of the principle of (mate-
rialist) dialectics down to two definitions: the first one involved a notion of ever-changing universe 
and the other the principle of change (involving thesis, antithesis and synthesis). Zhang’s main 
point of contention with Marxist dialectics resided in its idea of evolution, which Zhang described 
in terms of transformative “swings”, and which in Marxist dialectics “appears to [take place only] 
for a limited period of time (qiongqi 窮期的); speaking in terms of swings, after [the change] had 
swung to and fro, [everything] will return back to a static (jingzhi 靜止) [state]. I am afraid that 
this is but an empty desire” (Zhang 2005 II, 99). Because at the time he was still a strong adherent 
of Russell and because in the same year he also got immersed into Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Zhang 
concluded that the “principle” of change in the world of tomorrow is still uncertain and unknown 
to us—he quoted well-known Russell’s statement that it is not certain that the sun will rise tomor-
row—and concluded with last sentence of the Tractatus, that we must be quiet about what cannot 
be spoken about (ibid.).
28 Zhang directly discussed Hegel only on a few occasions. Beside his late “Household Words” (Ji-
achang hua 家常話), he mentioned Hegel in Reflections—Continued (Zhang 2005 III, 182–83), 
where he also delivered an expanded definition of his idea of materialist dialectics, which, however, 
also reveals great discrepancies with both Hegel’s and the materialist notion of dialectics.
29 In line with Engels, Plekhanov and Lenin, Zhang believed that the dynamic aspect had a prece-
dence over the static. However, Zhang also believed that any aspect of human thought in essence 
is already of a “dynamic” disposition, which he understood under qualities of “liveliness” (huo 活), 
“thoroughness” (zhouquan 周全), attention to the interrelatedness of things, evolutionary perspec-
tive, complementarity of opposites, unity of theory and practice etc. (Zhang 2005 II, 330).
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actually failed to get an adequate grasp of the latter, which he contorted in ana-
logical accord with his version of traditional cosmology. 
The Pillars of Zhang Shenfu’s Philosophy—Reflections (1931)
As already mentioned in the introductory remarks, the first major formative turn 
in Zhang’s philosophy occurred when he started distancing himself from Russell 
and devoting more attention to traditional and materialist dialectics. The seminal 
impetus, however, that eventually led to the shift in direction of his thinking came 
from his recognition of the vital necessity of “comprehensiveness”, and the prior-
ity of “greater objectivism” over the blunt analytical dissection of facts. In Zhang’s 
opus this shift had been most concretely manifested in a series of general phil-
osophical meditations composed between 1928 and 1930. These were eventually 
epitomized in his monograph Reflections (Suosi 所思), issued in 1931. Reflections 
consists of a collection of homonymously titled short meditations written in the 
years between 1924 and 1930, which were supplemented by a few of Zhang’s 
quintessential writings from the late 1920s. As Zhang’s signature-work from the 
period, Reflections offers the most exhaustive insight into his world of ideas, pro-
viding a set of clear-cut statements about the main ideal pillars of his philosophy. 
In the introduction to Reflections, Zhang wrote that all ideas raised in the text had 
been derived from two main principles: 
1. Mutual opposition (xiangfan 相反) and mutual creation (xiangcheng 相
成)—a harmony of contradictions. 
2. Scientific method as the method of pure objectivity (chun keguanfa 純客觀
法). (Zhang 2005 III, 53)
In the subsequent part of the introduction, Zhang offered the following explana-
tion of the above two principles:
On the first point, the (bi)polarity of phenomena,30 I have already ex-
pounded on in a publication from the beginning of 1919. At that time, I 
was still unaware of the nowadays widespread notion of dialectical meth-
od. But, in truth, to get to these conclusions one would only need to look 
at the facts realistically. Besides, to speak about yi 易 (change) in terms of 
one yang and one yin is basically an extremely ancient idea espoused by 
the Chinese. The same idea is also equal to Confucius’ “humaneness” (ren 
仁). “Humaneness” and “the scientific method”; I believe these are the 
30 Zhang is referring to the article “Philosophical Principles of Numbers” (1919).
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two most precious things. Among the things which in recent years have 
most often reappeared in my mind or resounded from my throat, were in 
particular the following four ideas: analysis (fenxi 分析; formerly, I espe-
cially preferred to use the word jiexi 解析), pluralism (duoyuan 多元), ob-
jectivism (keguan 客觀) and realism (qieshi 切實). If we combine the last 
two, we can obtain the fashionable notion called “materialism” (weiwu 唯
物). Also, as was explained by Russell, the person who most understood 
these things, the key characteristic of what is generally referred to as “the 
theory of realism”, …, was the belief that the method [ought to] reside 
in analysis and cosmology in pluralism. Because of that, I am most op-
posed to the ideas of “everything or nothing” and the anthropomorphism 
(renhua sixiang 人化思想) which is disseminated by the literati. Instead, 
I strongly believe that, in its entirety, the world is unanimous and com-
plex. Originally, I spoke about the “entanglement between the positive 
and negative” or used to say that everything is mutually entangled. It is 
also possible to put it like this: Events in the world are always random 
(against expectations) in this or another way, they mutually cause (give 
rise) or suppress each other, swinging in or out of existence. (ibid.) 
In the same section of Reflections Zhang also gave his idea of “comprehensiveness” 
in philosophy:
I believe that “comprehensiveness” (tong 通) is the ultimate goal of phi-
losophy. Analysis, pluralism, objectivity, and realism all are ways of “com-
prehensiveness”. They are all applications of “comprehensiveness”. Con-
versely, “comprehensiveness” is also a complement to analysis, etc. The 
mutual entanglement of everything can only be comprehended through 
“comprehensiveness”. Only through comprehensiveness will one not suc-
cumb to rigidness (obstinacy). Only thus, one will be able to grasp two 
[opposite things] and employ the mean (zhong 中). In that way, one will 
be able to accumulate numerous views and recognize the reason why the 
obscure is hidden from one’s sight, and restore each one to its appropriate 
position. (ibid., 54)
The above two excerpts from Reflections reveal Zhang’s strong propensity to-
wards comprehensive worldviews. In a more explicit way, Zhang draws a par-
allel between the idea of dialectical complementarity of opposites from tra-
ditional Chinese philosophy and dialectical materialism. In Zhang’s opinion, 
science and philosophy both share a common objective in a universal system 
of knowledge, which would be endowed with a just as universally applicable 
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dialectical-analytical method. Secondly, what Zhang further proposed was a 
syncretic marriage between the above-described dialectical principle on one side 
and scientific objectivity on the other.31
Figure 1: The title page of the 1931 publication of the book Suosi 所思 (Reflections) 
31 This marriage between “dialectics” and “pure objectivism” was adamantly rejected by Zhang 
Dongsun, who published his critique of Zhang’s philosophical notions in the Xueyuan complement 
to the Beiping chenbao. (See Guo 1965, 263)
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On the other hand, Zhang’s exposition on the central pillars of his “modern sci-
entific” outlook can also shed some light on the intellectual background of his 
understanding of modern science and philosophy. As noted above, it also explains 
why Zhang recognized in dialectical materialism a plausible and objective doc-
trine. That this quest for reconciliation between any antagonisms of this universe 
did also involve the problematic relationship between East (China) and the West 
transpires in the following statement: “In my opinion, ‘humaneness’ (ren 仁) and 
‘scientific method’ are humankind’s greatest treasures. Humaneness comes from 
the East and scientific method comes from the West” (Zhang 2005 III, 64). In 
other words, like Zhang Shizhao before him, Zhang’s comprehensive philosophi-
cal outlook also aimed at creating a synthesis between the spiritual civilization of 
the East and the material and analytic West. Interestingly, the potential adhesive 
for the two poles was provided in the form of a few key concepts from traditional 
Chinese philosophy. Thus, in addition to being a nature-related or ethical princi-
ple, Zhang also recognized in ren 仁 (humaneness) a form of scientific/objectivist 
attitude, which can lead to objectivist enlightenment and benefit people by means 
of conferring on them an insight into the realm of truth.32 Already back 1927, 
Zhang presented his first idea of a possible methodological solution, one that 
would adequately embody both the principle of humaneness as well as scientific 
method, and at the same time satisfy the vital precondition of “comprehensive-
ness”. He chose to call this theory “the method of pure objectivism” (chun keguanfa 
純客觀法). 
Finally, the overall configuration of the main pillars of Zhang’s philosophy, as 
outlined in his Reflections, can be illustrated by the following scheme:
32  One of Zhang’s later articles, “Humaneness and the Visionary (Ren yu xianjuezhe 仁與先覺者)” 
(1939a), reveals that his notion of ren 仁 derived heavily from his reading of Zhu Xi 朱熹. Zhang 
reconceptualized Zhu Xi’s notion of humaneness, emphasizing its equality with the ethical value of 
scientific attitude as well as its inherent connection to Western philosophical doctrines, which in 
one way or another created a synthesis between two antagonistic categories. On Zhu Xi’s definition 
of ren see, for instance Huang 2017, 180–209. Intriguingly, in his Reflections Zhang also empha-
sized that love (ai 愛) embodies both the principle of complementarity (xiangcheng xiangfan) as 
well as the method of pure objectivism (Zhang 2005 III, 144).
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Tong 通
(Comprehensiveness)
Harmony of contradictions ↔ Scientific method
Confucius’ “humaneness” (ren 仁)
Book of Change (complementarity of yin and 
yang)
↔




↔ Russell’s New realism
Logical Analysis
Realism Objectivism Analysis Pluralism
Apart from the six main pillars set out above—from dialectics to the scientific meth-
od—Zhang’s epistemological views in Reflections were also derived from modern 
physics. In the late 1920s, Following Russell’s example, Zhang endeavoured to inte-
grate various aspects of modern physics, such as Einstein’s Theory of Relativity, the-
ory of atoms and quantum mechanics, into his own philosophical discussions.33 The 
immediate result of his longstanding interest in modern physics was also his episte-
mological standpoint of “concrete relativism” (juti xiangduilun 具體相對論) which he 
developed at the beginning of 1940s. Nevertheless, in the time when Zhang was still 
writing his Reflections, his focus was still fixed on “neutral monism”, a concept with 
which Russell used to describe his own version of New Realism. In the earliest parts of 
Reflections (around 1925), Zhang advocated a version of “monistic dualistic plurality”, 
where “monism refers to neutral monism and plurality refers to absolute pluralism” 
and “dualism refers to dialectics and polarity”34 (Zhang 2005 III, 61). 
As Zhang himself indicated in the preface to this book, the notion of dialectical 
materialism started to appear only in the latter parts of his, as it were, intellectual 
diary (Reflections—Continued), composed after 1928. Concurrently, in these later 
sections, Zhang’s idea of “pure objectivism” had already evolved into a theory of 
“greater objectivism” (da keguanfa 大客觀法).
In the subsequent section of our discussion, we will take a closer look at the 
above-listed central concepts in Zhang’s philosophy in the period between 1919 
and 1948 (apart from “mathematical logic”). 
33  Here, I am referring to articles like “A New Discovery in Science” (1928), and “Russell on New 
Theory of Atoms” (1928).
34  Beside Russell and Confucius, Zhang’s Reflections also contain numerous references to Wittgen-
stein, Freud, Frege and Zhuangzi. In one of his meditations, Zhang also mentioned Frank P. Ram-
sey’s work The Foundation of Mathematics. 
↑ ↑ ↑↑
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Key Concepts in Zhang’s Philosophical Thought
Greater Objectivism
The theory of “greater objectivism” represented Zhang’s first concrete attempt to 
create a universal epistemological method, which would be able to integrate all 
aspects of human perception and cognition. By setting out to reconcile the realms 
of subjective and objective, Zhang also wanted to attain harmonic complemen-
tarity between human understanding of the antithetical aspects of existence in 
general.35 As we have already indicated above, it could be argued that Zhang’s 
attempt at merging together the objective and subjective into a more compre-
hensive view of knowledge was implicitly echoing the main intellectual dilemma 
of the time, which, in great part, had been promulgated through the science and 
the view on life debate. Zhang’s probable solution to the problem of the inner 
epistemic schism of the modern human being, as established in the debate, was 
first described in a short essay entitled “The Method of Pure Objectivism (Chun 
keguanfa 純客觀法)” from 1927.36 
The term “pure objectivism” was an early version of Zhang’s later notion of “greater 
objectivism” (da keguan 大客觀). The term appeared for the first time in his article 
“A Comparative Discussion on Modern Philosophy (Xiandai zhexue jiaolun 現代
哲學校論)” issued in 1926,37 where Zhang discussed two antagonistic currents in 
Western philosophy: realism and idealism.38 He maintained that the antagonistic 
relationship between the two currents of thought was rooted in the qualitative 
dichotomy within human nature. Combining the traditional dichotomy between 
yin and yang and the Marxist dialectics of nature, he asserted that, in general, there 
exist two kinds of human disposition: 
35  Here, I assume that Zhang maintained a holistic notion of reality, where the epistemic duality was 
seen as a direct reflection of a dialectical nature of the universe. 
36  The essay, which was first published in the Chenbao fukan 晨報副刊 in 1927, was later reprinted in 
Reflections.
37  Zhang’s recapitulation of current trends in Western philosophy from 1926 was based on his read-
ing of Joad’s Introduction to Modern Philosophy—in the same year Zhang completed his translation 
of this work. The above-mentioned article was published under the title “Xiandai zhexue jiaolun 現
代哲學校論 (A Comparative Discussion on Modern Philosophy)”.
38  A bipartite division of philosophy was also applied in Zhang Dongsun’s early critical excursions 
into logicism and New Realism (Zhang 1922, 15–16). Zhang distinguished between two philo-
sophical systems, where the first one represented a “philosophy of thought” that advocated logicism, 
transcendentalism and rational knowledge; while the contesting “philosophy of life” advocated a 
form of psychologism, empiricism, stressed particular content and stood against rational knowl-
edge. According to Zhang Dainian, this classification was borrowed from the thought of Zhang 
Junmai. 
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One is progressive, the other conservative; one appreciates new, the other 
adores old; one is revolutionary, the other reactionary; one is fast, the 
other slow; one is sensitive, the other apathetic; one is dynamic, the other 
static …39 We could simply collectively call them left and right. (Zhang 
1926a, 81)
In Zhang’s opinion, the above-described dialectical schism within the forces of the 
universe also gave rise to the distinction between the realist and idealist schools 
of philosophy.40 As one would expect, Zhang spoke in favour of the realist school, 
for which he gave the following explanation:
Realism presupposes the existence of the real … it observes reality 
through reality. It is objective and aims at overturning the fallacies of 
mind. It emphasizes knowledge and the universal patterns (li 理). Usu-
ally, it seeks support and guidance in the natural laws of transformation 
(tianxing 天行, “movement of Heaven”). By application of analysis as its 
method, it focuses on what is presently at hand, it resolves trivialities and 
does not ignore what is universal and primary (universal elements). It is 
harmonious with science; it is young and revitalizing. In its search for 
knowledge within the real it advances bravely … (ibid.)
In the above excerpt, the term “analysis” refers to Russell’s “logical analysis”, which 
Zhang regarded as a method consistent with the principles and results of math-
ematical logic. In this very sense, he looked upon mathematical logic as a key 
component of an objective outlook on reality. 
In the conclusion of the above-mentioned essay from 1926, Zhang already 
raised the idea that philosophy has one single aim: to establish a “broader view” 
of reality. Moreover, that in philosophy the greatest priority must be assigned to 
logical analysis and synthesis. However, as Zhang later discovered, such all-en-
compassing objectivity also entailed a due inclusion of all aspects of human 
nature, namely the sphere of subjectivity. Thus, in the final sentence of the article 
he enthusiastically asserted that a future kind of world-philosophy would only 
be created by virtue of the method of “pure objectivism”, which would itself 
combine the two aspects. 
39  The terms static and dynamic had been adopted from Marxist discourse on the dialectics of nature 
and dialectical materialism in general. In his Dialectics of Nature, for instance, Engels spoke about 
two contradictory forces in the universe: attraction (gravity) and repulsion (energy of the stars). 
40  The representatives of the former, progressive current in philosophy, were Russell and Whitehead, 
while at the other side of the divide were philosophers like Bergson, Driesch, and so on.
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One year later, in 1927, Zhang had already delivered the first version of such 
an all-encompassing objectivism. The article “The Method of Pure Objectivism 
(Chun keguanfa 純客觀法)” elucidates its core idea in the following way: “[pure 
objectivism] goes beyond (跳出) the dichotomy between subjective and objective, 
[and at the same time remains] objective by attaching the utmost importance 
to the objectiveness” (Zhang 1927a, 57). The relationship between “subjective” 
and “objective” was further interpreted in terms of si 私 “private” and gong 公 
“common”, where the subjective was seen explicitly as the inner perspective and 
the objective as a view from without. Consequently, the ultimate aim of a purely 
objective view would be to overcome the one-sidedness of either subjectivity or 
objectivity and in turn endow both with a higher level of objectiveness. In order 
to demonstrate the feasibility of such an extraordinary idea, Zhang provided the 
following diagram:
Figure 2: Zhang’s Diagram of Pure Objectivism (Source: Zhang 2005 II, 95)
 
Zhang provided the following explanation for this diagram:
In their basis, the subjective and the objective are antithetical; they are 
contrary to each other, yet they still depend on each other. We could also 
say that they mutually oppose and create each other (xiangfan xiangcheng 
相反想成). In the picture, the symbol A (甲) represents the objective, 
and the symbol B (乙) represents the subjective. Between A and B there 
is a reciprocal relationship, expressed by two the arrows pointing in op-
posite directions. What I call “going beyond subjective and objective” 
means to leave behind the antithetical opposition between A and B. But 
to do that, we must first surpass the subjective domain. The area sig-
nified by the symbol C (丙) represents the place we want to attain by 
leaving the relationship between A and B. The single arrows represent 
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the relationship and direction of our surpassing. When we jump to the 
point C, and we take another look at A and B, are they not viewed from 
without? In that way, have they not already both become objective? This 
is what we mean by saying that “subjective is also objective”. But when we 
look from C, the event of antithesis we have previously seen, the objects 
A and B become even more so a product of fabricated distinctions (in 
logic this is called “a logical construction” which maybe we could also call 
“logical fabrication”). … “when the pure objectivism is established these 
become mere events”. This is already to speak about things and events 
from methodological point of view, therefore the cosmological [maxim] 
we should obtain from pure objectivity ought to be: everything makes up 
its own event. (Zhang 1927a, 57)
In short: pure objectivism surpasses both the conventional objectivism and sub-
jectivity by means of presenting a view on both from without. At the same 
time, the pursuit for such a dialectical synthesis would essentially also satisfy 
an ethical goal, for, in Zhang’s eyes, one of the main objectives of humaneness 
was also related to the attainment of the principles of “equilibrium” (zhong) and 
“humaneness” (ren). 
Another important source for Zhang’s theory of pure objectivism was Einstein’s 
concept of relativity, in which, in a philosophical sense, the objective and sub-
jective views become redefined through the so-called “observer’s effect”. Indeed, 
Zhang explicitly claimed that his newly invented method was devised in ac-
cordance with the recent tendencies in modern science, such as relativist physics 
and behaviourist psychology (Zhang 2005 II, 97).
In the parts of his Reflections written a year later (1927/1928), Zhang indicated 
that his objectivism equalled Russell’s ethical neutrality. This correlation was 
supposed to reside in the fact that the method of pure objectivism enabled a 
harmonic unison between self and the nature, making both indistinguishable 
from each other (Zhang 2005 III, 83–84). In Reflections—Continued (Xu Suosi 
續所思) (around 1930), where his idea of dialectical materialism had already 
occupied the central place in Zhang’s philosophical outlook, he emphatically 
ascribed to greater objectivism the ability to solve all the problems of human-
kind (ibid., 165).
In the early 1930s, the notion of dialectical materialism lay at the very heart of 
Zhang’s philosophical meditations. Basically, Zhang treated dialectical materi-
alism as a methodological utility akin to the aforementioned concept of logi-
cal analysis. Already in the sequel to his Reflections, Zhang pointed out that the 
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dialectical method41 was a “science of sciences, technique of techniques and method 
of methods” (ibid., 178). Formerly, Zhang had ascribed the same attributes to log-
ical analysis, which seems to have retained a similar place in his later philosophy. 
Moreover, regardless of the level of their objectivist potency, in the framework of 
greater objectivism they both ought to be supplemented by the subjective intuition 
and imagination. With the gradual ascent of dialectical materialism, in Zhang’s eyes 
its very essence became ever more synonymous with philosophy as such. Whereas 
in the earliest parts of Reflections Zhang maintained that philosophy “straightens 
the virtues (de 德) and enlightens [the correct] human relations (lun 倫)”42 (ibid., 
90), in the parts written after 1930 he ascribed the same attributes to the dialectical 
method, reducing its main principles to liveliness (huo 活), universality (also quan 
全 “whole” ) and practice (ibid., 178). Furthermore, in Zhang’s opinion the proxim-
ity between dialectical materialism and the Confucian value of “humaneness” was 
based on the fact that in Marxism one of the main objectives of the revolution (gem-
ing 革命) was to resolve social contradictions—i.e. to “harmonize” human relations.
Objectivism Versus Materialism
Greater objectivism and dialectical materialism remained at the forefront of 
Zhang’s philosophy up to the late 1940s. In 1945 Zhang reformulated his theory 
of greater objectivism in his article “My Own Philosophy (Wo ziji de zhexue” 我
自己的哲學)”. At this stage, Zhang’s approach relied heavily on his new under-
standing of dialectical materialism and his notion of concrete relativism. Thus, in 
the 1945 exposition of his philosophical views, he distinguished between a (as it 
were) “legitimate” scientific objectivism and a mechanist objectivism. The latter, 
which Zhang compared to the “observer’s view”, was defined in the following way:
It does neither recognize the function of the subjective, nor does it exhib-
it human power, but simply maintains the current objective circumstanc-
es. This is a “dead” objectivism. It is a mechanical type of objectivism. This 
is the form of objectivity, which 50 years ago Lenin portrayed as standing 
in contrast with materialism. It is a least acceptable form of ideology. 
(Zhang 2005 II, 335)
41  In the debates on dialectical materialism from the first half of the 1930s, the term “dialectical 
method” (bianzhengfa 辯證法, also “dialectics”) was synonymous with “dialectical logic” (bianzheng 
luoji 辯證邏輯). In the earliest Chinese expositions of dialectical logic, which relied in great part on 
Plekhanov’s critique of formal logic, dialectical logic was also referred to as “dynamic logic” (dongde 
luoji 動的邏輯). 
42  He further defined virtue as “what perfects all things and beings” and human relations as “what 
makes all things and beings equal”. 
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Zhang’s version of objectivism, on the other hand,
both recognizes the objective and is aware of the existence of the subjec-
tive. In one sense, the so-called “greater” objectivism broadens the scope 
of objectivity, and at the same time also integrates into his own system 
the subjective. It relies mainly on the objective and integrates the sub-
jective and the objective into one. On one hand, it recognizes objective 
facts and makes them its foundation, and on the other hand also accepts 
the function of the subjective. The objective is not only the objective, 
but it also encompasses subjective elements. A nonsensical approach in 
Western philosophy is creating a sharp antagonism between the subjec-
tive side of the human being and the so-called independently existing 
outer world, which does not include the human. My objectivism intends 
to avoid this [problem]. A realistic recognition that humans are also a 
kind of thing (wu 物) can definitely reduce many inconveniences that are 
troubling the humankind. (ibid.) 
In addition to this, Zhang also alleged that this “greater objectivism” could also 
“pacify the mind through attainment of the principle” (li de xin an 理得心安). 
While, as before, the main aim of greater objectivism was comprehensiveness, 
“another meaning of my greater objectivism is related to knowledge. Knowledge 
starts with perception. I believe that knowledge which comes from perception is 
neither subjective nor objective, but a form of relationship between the subjective 
and the objective” (ibid., 336).
In the 1930s one of Zhang’s priorities was the spreading of dialectical materialism, 
and this also gave rise to a fundamental need to integrate the theoretical tenets of 
dialectical materialism into his own comprehensive philosophy.43 In consequence, 
Zhang composed an article titled “Objectivity and Materialism (Keguan yu wei-
wu 客觀與唯物)” (1933), in which he set out to demonstrate how his notion of 
greater objectivity and dialectical materialism were merely two sides of the very 
same thing. In order to prove his point, Zhang redefined the main aim of greater 
objectivism as the synthesis between theory and practice, because it also included 
43  In 1932, for instance, in an essay titled “Egg and Chicken—Heroes and Circumstances: On an 
Application of Dialectical Materialism ( Jidan yu ji – Yingxiong yu shishi: weiwu bianzhengfa 
yingyong zhiyi 鷄蛋與鷄 – 英雄與時勢：唯物辯證法應用之一)”, where Zhang claimed that 
dialectical materialism can resolve paradoxical questions like “What was first, a chicken or an egg?” 
because it embodied the principle of evolution (Zhang 2005 II, 166–69). The resolution of the 
problem of “chicken and egg” by dialectical method was not Zhang’s original idea, but was adopted 
from contemporary Chinese translations of keyworks of Soviet Marxist philosophy—e.g. Tao Bo’s 
陶伯 translation of Bukharin’s Historical Materialism (in 3 volumes) from 1930 (see Bukharin 1930 
III, 8 (Appendix I)).
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value judgments. Rendered in this way, Zhang’s objectivism would be aimed at 
perfecting the human capacity to realise value-ideas, which cannot be divorced 
from the domain of the subjective. Zhang also pointed out: “What is the meaning 
of ‘value’ (jiazhi 價值)? It means ‘zhi 值’: ‘to be just right’, ‘with right measure’” 
(Zhang 2005 II, 179). Ideas, however, have to be understood, perceived or defined 
by the people, who are in turn also transforming them into values. Consequently, 
the subjective within greater objectivism must necessarily represent elements per-
taining to a social class and cannot be considered as something individua, and in 
this very point Zhang recognized its main practical application.44 Greater objec-
tivism does not neglect human effort or human influence. It attaches importance 
to the real and stresses human practice. Hereby, it not only focuses on current, fac-
tual circumstances, but also on what is potential or caused by these circumstances. 
It encourages people to realise their future potentials (ibid.).
Shortly before this, Zhang also published an article entitled “Dialectical Comple-
mentarity and Pure Objectivism (Xiangfan xiangcheng yu chun keguanfa 相反相
成與純客觀法)” which proposed the same relationship between pure objectivism 
and the traditional concept of dialectical complementarity (xiangfan xiangcheng 
相反相成, “mutual opposition and mutual creation”).45 According to Guo Zhan-
bo, in this article Zhang defends his position that the dialectical method is purely 
objective and that consequently a philosophy established upon such principle (i.e. 
dialectical materialism) has got scientific bases. Later, Zhang’s claims were coun-
tered by Zhang Dongsun, who adamantly denied that dialectic materialism had 
been established on objective science.46 
Regardless how effective dialectical materialism was alleged to be in solving var-
ious kinds of scientific and social problems, as Zhang himself conceded, in its 
essence it still differed significantly from the equally significant methods of logi-
cal analysis and mathematical logic. Consequently, Zhang concluded that, as just 
44  Zhang claimed that greater objectivity does not neglect human effort or human influence. It at-
taches importance to the real and [at the same time also] emphasizes human practice. Hereby, it 
does not only focus on current, factual circumstances, but also on the potential or what is caused by 
these circumstances. It [also] encourages people to realise their future potentials. (ibid.) 
45  The article is mentioned in Guo Zhanbo’s 郭湛波 Chinese Intellectual History in the Last Fifty Years 
from 1935 (Guo 1965, 227). It originally appeared in Xueyuan 學園, a supplement to the Beiping 
chenbao 北平晨報. 
46  Guo Zhanbo (1965, 263) summarized the main thesis of Zhang Dongsun’s article as follows: 
 Mutual opposition and mutual creation (Xiangfan xiangcheng 相反相成) are Hegel’s dialectics 
(duikan fa 對勘法), and pure objectivism is a method which goes beyond every coordinate system. 
The two of them can in no way match each other. Therefore, one can absolutely not produce or 
develop pure objectivism out of [the principle] of mutual opposition and mutual creation. 
 The alleged article of Zhang Dongsun—titled “Xiangcheng xiangfan yu chun keguanfa 相成相反
與純客觀法”—was also mentioned in Cai 1936, 35. 
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another method, the dialectical method could not replace logic, nor could it re-
place science as such (Zhang 2005 II, 169). 
Between Logical Analysis and Dialectical Materialism— 
“Dialectical Analysis”
Zhang’s understanding of the term “logical analysis” was intricately related to 
his notion of mathematical logic as one of the most advanced products of con-
temporary Western science (see Zhang 1920a, 4). In Zhang’s eyes, “logical anal-
ysis” represented a method of philosophical inquiry, a theoretical extension of 
the otherwise purely scientific mathematical logic, where the main results and 
mechanisms of the latter were extrapolated to solving problems of a practical 
and theoretical nature. In other words: logical analysis was a practical extension 
of mathematical logic.47 
Under this meaning, logical analysis represented a recurring concept in Zhang’s 
philosophical and political writings. In the second half of the 1920s, when Zhang 
first discovered Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, he also regarded it 
as a component of “logical analysis”. Similarly, in the early 1930s, when Zhang 
and his younger brother Zhang Dainian were introducing the Viennese School to 
Chinese philosophical circles, he also regarded this movement as a direct outcome 
of “logical analysis.” This reveals that in later years, for Zhang, “logical analysis” 
simply denoted an analytical variety of philosophy, which was methodologically 
based on mathematical logic. In the 1930s, when he was still a professor of logic 
at Qinghua University, his fascination with mathematical logic also led Zhang to 
devote his attention to the thought of Rudolf Carnap and Kurt Gödel—although 
none of his writings explicitly demonstrated that he really understood their work. 
In his second overview of contemporary Western philosophy, the essay “Main 
Currents in Contemporary Philosophy (Xiandai zhexue de zhuchao 現代哲學
的主潮)”, which was published in the Qinghua Weekly (Qinghua zhoukan 清華
周刊) magazine in 1934, Zhang presents a new image of world philosophy, 
dominated by two contesting philosophical schools: the first was “logical anal-
ysis” and the other dialectical materialism. While in Zhang’s opinion the main 
objective of the school of “logical analysis” was to “clarify thoughts and words” 
47  In contrast to the majority of stark exponents of Marxist philosophy from the 1930s and 40s, 
Zhang believed that formal logic is in its essence entirely “dynamic”—namely, that it essentially 
incorporates all major aspects of dialectical method, and that its character depends only on the 
angle from which you study it. Therefore, he also advocated the motion that formal logic could be 
fused together with dialectics to form one harmonic entity (see Zhang 2005 II, 330).
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so as to render them capable of expressing objective facts, the chief concern of 
materialism was the existence of objective facts per se. In this very definition 
of analysis and materialism, Zhang recognized the same relationship as pre-
viously believed to have existed between science and the view on human life 
(renshengguan 人生觀), where the latter had also been linked to traditional Chi-
nese thought (see Zhang Junmai 1997). Thus, by analogy, in his writing from 
1934 Zhang recognized in dialectical materialism a form of philosophy which, 
apart from the scientific method (inductive aspect) also incorporated practical 
aspects such as “revolutionary practice” and a “life-oriented attitude”. As such 
dialectical materialism could be seen as an important locus of Zhang’s search for 
comprehensive worldviews—dialectical materialism as a holistic view on matter, 
changes and the interrelatedness among phenomena. At the same time, with 
regard to mathematical logic, Zhang’s focus now turned away from Russell to 
the Vienna School and Prague as the current centres of mathematical logic and 
probabilistic logic in Europe (Zhang 1934, 10–11).
In the spirit of his greater objectivism, Zhang believed that although dialectical 
materialism and logical analysis might appear to stand in absolute opposition to 
each other, in fact they are entirely complementary and compatible. They both, for 
example, originated in science and denounced metaphysics, and are compatible in 
the sense that due to their diametrically opposite characteristics (e.g. one is specif-
ic while the other tends towards generalization), they represent the most effective 
supplements to each other (ibid., 10). The supposition that dialectical materi-
alism can supplement “logical analysis” or, more specifically, mathematical logic 
led Zhang to assert that the former could also be used for resolving problems in 
fundaments of mathematics, especially where logicism (shuli luoji hua 數理邏輯
化 “logicization of mathematical principles”), formalism (xingshilun 型式論) and 
intuitionism (zhijuelun 直覺論) had been unable to present any feasible solutions. 
According to Zhang, many philosophical problems could also be solved through 
the combined application of both logical analysis and dialectical materialism. 
At the beginning of the 1940s, when Zhang’s philosophical thought entered yet 
another developmental phase, Zhang conceived his final theory of “concrete rel-
ativism” (juti xiangduilun 具體相對論). In its initial form, this idea had already 
been mentioned in his essay on contemporary philosophy from 1934. In the con-
text of his “concrete relativism”, the dialectical method and logical analysis were 
further merged into one single methodological body, which he believed to be an 
important step towards the comprehensiveness and application (yong 用) of sci-
entific knowledge. In his attempt to devise such a comprehensive method, Zhang 
coined the terms “dialectical analysis” (bianzheng jiexi 辯證解析) and “analytical 
dialectical materialism” (jiexi de bianzheng weiwulun 解析的辯證唯物論) that 
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stood for a fusion between dialectical materialism and logical analysis, and the 
central methodological machinery of “concrete relativism” (Zhang 1934, 12). In 
this unlikely marriage, the focus of the “dialectical part” would be to study rela-
tionships, changes and developments, to examine internal contradictions (struggle 
between the opposites), relationships of mutual opposition and mutual production 
(xiangfan xiangcheng), and the dialectical development of quality and quantity. 
While, on the other hand, the duties of logical analysis would be semantics, logic, 
and theoretical systematization.48 Zhang further claimed that another common 
feature of logical analysis and the dialectical method lay in their strong propensity 
towards the unification of all sciences. 
As we have already noted above, the above-mentioned synthesis between logical 
analysis and dialectical materialism was presented as an integral part of his epis-
temological theory called “concrete relativism”. 
Concrete Relativism
In its essence, Zhang’s idea of “concrete relativism” was derived from Russell’s 
“neutral monism”, and his notion of relativity of knowledge based on his interpre-
tation of relativity in physics. Initially, Zhang also referred to his theory as “abso-
lute relativism” (juedui xiangduilun 絕對相對論) or “relative absolutism” (xiangdui 
jueduilun 相對絕對論). 
In “Concrete Relativism ( Juti xiangduilun 具體相對論)” from 1943, his earliest 
essay devoted exclusively to this theory, Zhang raised two major theses: “truth 
is concrete” and “the absolute is the concentration of the relative”. Herewith, 
Zhang wanted to indicate the complexity of the question of truth and falseness 
(of a theory or proposition). Zhang proposed his theory of concrete relativism as 
an alternative to traditional epistemologies, which fail to take into account the 
above-mentioned fluidity of true and false. Moreover, in his concrete relativism 
he also endeavoured to supply a methodology which could provide the pivotal 
criteria for establishing the right measure (zhong 中 or zhi 值) of truth (Zhang 
1943, 320–21). 
With respect to the main cause for the above-mentioned epistemological obscuri-
ty, Zhang adopted the standpoint of the Western proponents of the linguistic turn, 
focusing on the positiveness of language (sense and meaning). At the same time, 
48  Namely: logical reasoning, differentiation between types (i.e. Russell’s theory of types); logical 
form, definition of classes, sets, functions and variables; a study of relations; establishment of theory 
on facts; systematisation of inference and dissolving fallacies (Zhang 1943, 322).
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he also claimed the same idea had been inherent in the traditional Chinese sub-
stance-function (ti-yong 體-用) dichotomy (e.g. nature versus man, order versus 
mediation). Zhang also believed that this dichotomy was embodied in the twofold 
structure of his philosophy: dialectics as its technique (pursuit for dao 道) and log-
ical analysis as its method. In order to demonstrate the objectiveness of his episte-
mological views, Zhang claimed that they were deduced from Russell’s theory of 
types. At the same time, he asserted that Russell’s theory in itself not only proved 
that “dialectical analysis” was attainable, but also demonstrated that rectification 
of relations between names and actualities (ming-shi 名實) was crucial for its at-
tainment of comprehensiveness and practical implementation (Zhang 1943, 322).
Zhang’s theory of concrete relativism was recapitulated in an article entitled 
“The Central Point of My Philosophy—Concrete Relativism (Wo de zhexue 
de zhongxindian – Juti xiangduilun 我的哲學的中心點 – 具體相對論)” which 
was published in 1945. In this, Zhang emphatically stated that the central source 
of his concrete relativism was “the theory of types form Russell’s mathematical 
logic”, whereas its other notable sources included Einstein’s theory of relativity, 
dialectical materialism and Chinese philosophy (Zhang 1945b, 10). He also reit-
erated his conviction that as a comprehensive synthesis of all branches of science 
concrete relativism could both significantly improve the rational capacity of the 
human mind and contribute to one’s inner (ethical) self-cultivation.49 
Because at the time Zhang believed physics to be the most important of all 
sciences, he proposed that in the process of verification in “concrete relativism” 
one would also have to examine the spatial and temporal dimensions in which 
a proposition or a theory is located—in addition to its evolutionary aspects and 
causal circumstances related to its sense. Zhang described such a verification as 
determination of the type, level, order and relational aspect within a proposition. 
While such an application would reveal the concreteness of facts, a concurrent 
“relativism” would imply that truth is not determinable in a straightforward way. 
Finally, in Zhang’s view such a “concrete and relative” method would lead to the 
49  An idea that was in line with Confucian notion of knowing (zhi 知) or wisdom (zhi 智) as an in-
tegral part of one’s inner self-cultivation (xiushen 修身). In a similarly “traditional” manner Zhang 
also assumed that “the perfection of dialectical analysis and a consistent practice of concrete rela-
tivism would be able to pacify people’s minds, bring unity to the world and establish a harmonic re-
lationship between the nature and man (Zhang 1945b, 11–12). In this sense, it becomes clear how 
the ethical aspect of Zhang’s comprehensive philosophy rested heavily on the Confucian concept 
of humaneness (ren 仁), which in the latter developments within East Asian Confucianisms was 
ascribed the same attributes and was believed to lead to same practical results—common welfare, 
inner harmony, etc. (For a detailed study on the concept of humaneness in East Asian Confucian-
isms see Huang 2017.) It is important to note that in such inclusion of the ethical aspect into his 
theory Zhang also recognized an essential prerequisite for its universal value and objectiveness. 
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complete clarification of language: by recognizing that language requires con-
creteness and the principles (li 理) [it denotes] are relative, one can prevent all 
mistakes and dispel all delusions (Zhang 1945b, 11–12).
Conclusion
The above outline of recurring key concepts from Zhang Shenfu’s philosophy 
reveals a number of special features, ones that ought to be taken under closer 
examination, not only in future surveys of the thought of this important Chinese 
thinker, but also in more general excursions into the intellectual history of modern 
China. Among the most outstanding and obvious such features is most certainly 
the intriguingly deep-running traditional undertone to all of Zhang’s attempts at 
grasping the meaning of his favourite Western teachings and ideas, as well as his 
persistent struggle to merge Western science with traditional Chinese cosmology. 
As indicated in the introductory remarks to this study, Zhang’s intellectual devel-
opment was crucially defined by the apparently schismatic dilemma of modernity, 
which incised a deep gorge between the two alleged poles of the modern world. 
Having been still deeply immersed in the ideas and perspectives of tradition-
al China—like many of his contemporaries—Zhang was barely able, and at the 
same time probably also unwilling, to overcome the profound differences between 
traditional and Western scientific worldviews. Hence, his intellectual undertak-
ings signified the stage or fragment in the process of adoption of Western ideas 
when the traditional base still prevailed over the system of ideas extracted from 
the Western thought. Here, it further needs to be noted that when it came to 
intellectual appropriation the logic in intellectual translation of Western natural 
science was not entirely the same as in the case of Western philosophy—or as the 
Chinese intellectuals themselves decided to call this category, the “view(s) on life” 
(renshengguan 人生觀). While, in the 1920s and 30s, the first (science) essentially 
involved a sense of onto-moral imperative (having been recognized as “objective”) 
and utilitarian necessity, the second touched on the sense of cultural identity or 
essence as an objectively autonomous spiritual realm (the subjective), as the main 
umbilical cord still interconnecting the day-to-day reality of modern China with 
its philosophical past. 
Like other intellectuals from the period, Zhang’s notions of Western science and 
philosophy rested predominantly on establishing analogies between the patterns 
and concepts in traditional thought/perception on one side, and corresponding 
patterns or, maybe even more importantly, terms in Western scientific worldviews 
(as holistic systems) on the other. Correspondingly, what appears to us as clear 
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errors in understanding—e.g. his idea of materialist dialectics—is also an expect-
ed outcome of such an analogical method of exploring certain ideas within a fun-
damentally holistic worldview, dominated by traditional concepts and categories 
as the basic norms of “similarity”. 
From his early years on, Zhang’s enthusiastic examinations of the philosophy of 
Bertrand Russell, mathematical logic and dialectical materialism were saturated 
with palpably traditional perspectives, including a strong dialectic and holistic 
view of reality. Gradually, Zhang himself also became aware of this essentially 
traditional feature of his thought, and in turn consciously embedded the idea of 
harmonic complementarity between opposites (xiangcheng xiangfan 相成相反) 
into his ideas about Western science, logic, analytical philosophy, and so on. The 
same principle was also extrapolated into his idea of pure or greater objectivism, 
which he also derived from the traditional Chinese idea of “comprehensive-
ness” (tong 通), which again indicates a universal interpenetration of all things 
and principles that compose the universe. On the other hand, deriving from 
the inherent ethical connotations of the cosmological constellations of prin-
ciples in Confucian thought, Zhang further established a connection between 
the “objectivistic spirit” of the Western scientific worldview and the Confucian 
concept of “humaneness” (ren 仁), which embodied yet another aspect of the 
all-encompassing unity of principles. Broadly speaking, in Confucian thought 
this concept represented the intersection between one’s inner moral cultivation 
(subjective) and the external order of things (objective), as the crucial starting 
point for attaining substantial consonance with the pattern (li 理, also “princi-
ple”) or the way (dao 道) of the universe. 
Zhang’s erratic and, on the surface, rather extravagant and inconsistent way of 
writing, made him a notoriously controversial thinker, already back in the years 
when he was still active as a philosopher. From the early days on, his writing was 
occasionally immensely cryptic and his conclusions extremely hasty and over-gen-
eralizing. However, a more scholarly counterpart to Zhang Shenfu soon arrived in 
the philosophical persona of his younger brother Zhang Dainian, who inculcated 
Zhang’s syncretistic philosophical ideas together with his key concepts into his 
own elaborate discussions of contemporary and traditional Chinese philosophy. 
In this sense it needs to be noted that Zhang Dainian’s philosophical writings 
from the 1930s constitute an important part of the whole picture, which might 
help us better understand Zhang Shenfu’s thought. 
Finally, even though from the vantage-point of a Western philosopher Zhang 
Shenfu on many occasions critically failed to understand certain concepts and the-
ories from Western philosophy (most notably the notion of dialectics in Hegelian 
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and Marxist philosophy), still his colourful scholarly style, his intellectual and 
political renown, his pioneering contributions (mostly in the propagation of 
certain notions) to Chinese studies of analytic philosophy and mathematical 
logic, and his immensely influential role in pivotal moments and movements 
in Republican China, make him an immensely important figure in modern 
Chinese intellectual history. Most of all, as a Republican intellectual Zhang 
also deserves to be studied because of his remarkably unique philosophy, which 
painted in the eyes of his numerous students and adherents—many of whom 
would go on to be leading Chinese Communists—an alternative, fundamentally 
“harmonic” and synthetic version of intellectual modernity, where, in an equally 
unique manner, a special place was reserved for both traditional thought as well 
as Western scientific notions such as mathematical logic and relativistic physics. 
Consequently, in the light of all the reasons set out above, a deeper interest and 
study of Zhang Shenfu and his philosophy may offer additional and crucial 
insights into one of the most important chapters of modern Chinese history. 
Moreover, because Zhang was also one of the leading proponents of dialectical 
materialism in China, a closer look at his thought may also offer a better insight 
into the general circumstances that surrounded the very formation of the intel-
lectual foundations of socialist China. 
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